Mediation is a process in which an impartial neutral (or a chairman
Introduction
Despite the fact that the Industrial Mediation Service (IMS) was introduced in 1970 as a rather novel addition to dispute-resolution procedures, research interest in mediation in New Zealand has been limited. There is, of course, no real "theory" of mediation and perhaps the subtleties and intangibles of the process do not lend themselves to systematic analysis. On the other hand, it may be felt that the m, ediation process is so simple, obvious and elementary that there is nothing to research; all that can be expected is analysis that is essentially descriptive and pragmatic. Given that much of mediation is confidential -thus leaving little or no documentary trace -there is an element of truth in the suggestion that "one can do little more than define it and wish it well" (Cullen, 1968, p. 53) .
However, since it became fully operational towards the end of January 1972, there has been a remarkable increase in the number of disputes handled by the IMS. The extent to which New Zealand employers and unions have been willing to utilise this particular forn1 of third-party intervention in conflict situations is clearly illustrated in Table 1 . Table 1 Disputes involving the Mediation Service and Conciliation Service, 1973 -1982 Year 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 Given this level of response. especially in the years after 1977, it seetned appropriate to tnark the first decade of actual n1ediation with a research project which explored the attitudes of ernployers and union officers to the IMS and to the tnediation process itself. Although the research thrust was specifically directed at the views of industrial relations practitioners over a wide range of topics, this paper exan1ines their attitudes to the single issue of strategies used in n1ediation.
Research background
The project was based on a questionnaire survey conducted over a period of 4 weeks in Dunedin, Christchurch, Wellington and Auckland. In this tirne, it was hoped to cover a sample population of at least 200 union officers and rnanagetnent representatives · with experience in n1edia tion and conci1ia tion. In fact, 218 con1pleted questionnaires were returned fron1 116 ernployers and 102 union officers. This san1ple size cotnpares favourably with sin1ilar studies in the United States and the United Kingdon1. \ It 1neant that the san1ple included n1ost of New Zealand's n1ajor con1panies. Since tnany of the union secretaries who were interviewed act for n1ore than one union, the satnple also covered a large proportion of private sector unions. As shown in Table 2 , a total of nearly 220 respondents . gave a reasonable spread across all industry groupings and, therefore, guaranteed that the attitudes of employers and union officers in all sectors were adequately represented. It was decided in the early planning stages that a postal survey would not have given a satisfactory response rate. There \vere n1ore than 50 specific questions, and tnany of these sub-divided so that each individual was required to give 139 separate answers to cotnplete the 18 pages of the questionnaire. This \Vas considered a rather daunting exercise for those with heavy work schedules. . The alternative was intensive field work to interview all potential respondents in order to discuss the research, explain aspects of the questionnaire approach and encourage participation in the project. The Employers Associations in OtagoSouthland, Canterbury, Wellington and Auckland were asked to prepare detailed lists of their affiliates kno\vn to be active in industrial relations in general and tnediation and conciliation in particular. A11 listed individuals were then interviewed and firn1 arrangenlents were made for the questionnaire either to be picked up by one of the researchers Mediator Strategies 173 or to be mailed to the University in Dunedin. A similar procedure was followed for all field officers employed by the 4 Employers Associations.. For union officers, lists were prepared from the Federation of Labour's Trade union directory, but otherwise the interview programme was identical to that adopted for employers. The approach, admittedly, was time-consuming. Yet it see1ned the best way of providing the type of infonnation so necessary for a wider appreciation of the mediation process in New Zealand.
The strategies of mediation
It is difficult to generalise on the question of how to mediate. There is no set formula which points out what strategies a mediator should use in different situations. The actual combination of strategies will depend on the issues in dispute, the economic strength of each party, the economic and social importance of the company's operation, the timing of entry, the atmosphere in the cotnmunity, the personalities of the disputants and, obviously, the personality of the mediator. . This suggests that it is impossible to develop a single set of strategic propositions appropriate for all mediation cases. Nevertheless, it should be possible to identify a nu1nber of broad strategies around which mediation revolves. Kenneth Kressel, for exatnple, suggests that, in practice, mediation boils down to 3 sets of strategies {Kresse!, 1972): reflexive, non-directive and directive. His is a sequential view of mediation and implies that the 3 sets of strategies will parallel the particular stages of the settlement process. 2 Early in the dispute, tl1e mediator will adopt reflexive strategies. These attempt to establish the groundwork upon which his later activities will be built. At this point, efforts are directed at gaining the trust and confidence of the parties, identifying the real leaders and understanding the relationship between the disputants. Later, a mediator will start to apply non-directive strategies aimed at increasing the probability that the parties themselves -with a minimum of manipulation from a mediator -will reach an acceptable solution to the dispute. This is a "mid-wifery kind of mediation" (Kressel, 1972, p. 13) . During this stage, a mediator will try to create a favourable climate for negotiation by patient listening, controlling hostility, trying to resolve the easier issues early on and generating positive expectations that agreement will finally be reached. The last stage of directive strategies refer to the mediator's active and vigorous attempts to deliberately pressure and manoeuvre the parties into ending a dispute. Forcing the parties to face reality, pressing them to change their bargaining positions, making substantive suggestions for settlement and generally applying pressure to settle are all part of a more aggressive or "caesarean approach to mediation" (Kressel, 1972, p. 
13).
Kresse} 's classification has been accepted by other researchers in a useful and convenient summary of the types of strategies that might be expected of mediators at different stages in a dispute (Kochan and Jick, 1978; Gerhart and Drotning, 1980) . It certainly offers a taxonomy of strategies capable of general application. In terms of the present study. , it seemed to provide an effective framework for investigating the frequency with which particular strategiẽs are used in Nẽw Zealand and the importance attached to them by employers and union officers.
The frequency of particular strategies
In the questionnaire, respondents were asked to specify how frequently certain strategies are used by a mediator (or conciliator) acting as chairman without right of deci-• sion. This was done by having them rate each one of 16 strategies on a 4 point scale from "Very Often", "Often", "Not Often" to "Never". It must be acknowledged that this requires a great deal of sophistication from respondents; to accurately recall what different mediators had atte1npted to do in previous disputes is not an easy task. Nevertheless, the frequency with which each strategy occurs in mediation (based on percentage responses in each of the 4 categories) is given in Table 3 . The evidence clearly shows that all strategies are frequently used by mediators. Even though the formal organisation of mediation in New Zealand differs markedly from other countries, it would appear that the essential strategy "mix" inside the actual mediation process is basically the same. However, there are interesting differences in the frequency with which some strategies are introduced. These differences deserve closer scrutiny. When all the strategies are ranked both by percentage responses in the single category "Very Often" and by percentage responses in the combined category "Very Often" and "Often", the least frequently used strategies are always the 2 that try to force the parties to face reality and try to change the parties' expectations. These are both directive strategies. Again, 4 out of the 6 directive strategies are in the lower half of the frequency ranking based on percentage responses in the category "Very Often", 5 out of the 6 directive strategies are in the lower half of a frequency ranking based on percentage responses in the combined category "Very Often" and "Often". Although all strategies are frequently used, it would seem that mediators in New Zealand are much more inclined to adopt a passive than an aggressive role in mediation. Mediators may have accepted all of the strategical underpinnings of mediation, but one strongly suspects that there still remains "the mistaken impression that his role will be less active than an arbitrator" (Grills, 1979, p. 
30).
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The importance of particular strategies
The frequency of mediator strategies offers a very brief insight into the strict mechanics of the mediation process. However, the importance attached to these strategies by the sample of employers and union officers is perhaps of greater concern. To gauge how important these 2 groups consider the various mediator initiatives to be in helping to resolve industrial disputes, respondents were asked to rate the same 16 strategies on a 4 point scale from "Very Important", "Important", "Doubtful Importance" to "Not Important". In Table 4 , it is interesting to note how close agreement is between the groups in their ranking of strategies considered important for successful mediation. Employer and union officer rankings by percentage responses in the category ' "Very Important" and the combined category "Very Important" and "Important" correlate highly (p = 0.82 and 0.88 respectively). There is a general consensus over the ranking of the 4 strategies considered the most important and the 2 considered the least important. There is little doubt that industrial relations practitioners believe that identifying the real issues in dispute, getting the trust and confidence of the parties, patient listening and keeping the parties talking are strategies central to the mediation process. Less enthusiastic support for pressing hard for compromise and trying to change the parties' expectations is significant because it underlines the fact that much less importance is attached to the directive strategies of mediation. In fact, a distinct lack of relish for an assertive, strong-ann approach by mediatotl II of percentage responses ill the Five out of the 6 directiv. both by employers and is ranked fifth by emplopra aad .a 19
It can be argued that this ltl8teD' ia d1e llut tors go much beyond offering settlement optioJW, dtay dling" (Miller, 1983, p. 35) .
The close agreement between en1ployen and wdoa ~ gies is repeated, to some extent, in their percentage to the In the combined category "Very Important" and " tile ,.,_ ponses are separated by less than 3 percentage points for 8 oat or the 10 non-directive strategies. When the weight of percentage telpCillll are ~ in the categories "Very Important" and "Important" for the 6 · · "' things stand out. First, the percentage responses from UDion officen are COillillelltlf lower than from employers. Secondly' the gap between the 2 sroups ia especiaDy J88tbd in the case of trying to change the parties' expectations, helping the parties to aaw face and trying to move the parties from positions previously held. Although tile evidence again confirms a reluctance by both parties to embrace directtre strategies, it is obviolll that this reluctance is much stronger for union officers than it is for employe1s.
Some implications
The results drawn from the research on the attitudes of the mediated to mediation clearly show that industrial relations practitioners are a little uncomfortable with sive mediation. This, one suspects, has created a vicious circle: because the partie& are uncomfortable with directive strategies, mediators tend not to be ve; because mediators are not aggressive, the parties get more used to passive strategies; because the parties commonly face passive strategies, they become uncomfortable in situations wllere the mediator tries to be intense and assertive. There is always the risk, of course, that aggressive behaviour by a mediator will irritate and antagonise the parties. However, a legitimate concern with mediator acceptability and maintaining the good will of the parties should not disguise the fact that, at some point in the process, mediators neell to be as much involved in ploys and strategems as either of the disputants. It may be neeessary for a mediator to assume the role of forceful advocate for a variety of reasons. The parties, for example, may not be able to deternline what is really important in the dispute; they may have become too concerned with certain solutions and lost that flexibility to consider other approaches; they may not realise that alternative solutions do exist; they may be constrained by ''political" forces from putting forward new proposals. At this stage, it might be better that mediators be criticised for being too aggressive rather than for being too timid, dull, listless or too unimaginative.
Miller makes the valuable point that no acceptable scheme has yet been devised to measure the effectiveness of neutrals in disputes procedures (Miller, 1983, p. 28) . Nevertheless, there is some recent evidence that active and aggressive mediator strategi.es appear to be somewhat more successful than passive strategies. Although the impact of directiPe strategies are a little more decisive in dealing with non-wage issues than they are With wqe issues, they do help in narrowing the differences between disputants even when is$pes remain unsettled. A point of interest from American experience, given the lukewarm support for directive strategies from New Zealand unionists, is that aggressive strategies are more likely to persuade unions rather than employers to ~e concesaioos dUI'IDi mediation (Kochan and Jick, 1978) . A comprehensive study of fnl,paae procedures 6y a team from Case Western Reserve University established that intense mediation is more frequently used by private or ad hoc mediators than full-time agency mediators (Gerlwt and Drotning, 1980 be expected to maintain that high level of intensity and concentration over a sustained period that is at the heart of assertive mediation. However, research data again supports the finding "that more intense behavior by a mediator is associated with greater progress in negotiations and a greater likelihood of settlement" (Gerhart and Drotning, 1980, p. 101) .
Although fresh evidence, admittedly from overseas experience, points to the fact that intense mediation should be encouraged, changing New Zealand attitudes to accept more frequent use of directive strategies will take time. The tendency for the more aggressive form of mediation to be carried out by ad hoc mediators in the United States has already been noted, but that alternative does not really exist in thls country. The IMS does not have attached to it teams of suitably qualified private or "home-town" mediators. The heavy work load carried by its staff of 6 mediators, therefore, makes it extremely difficult for them to sustain the momentum required of intense mediation ovẽr long periods of time. Furthermore, intense mediation can be rather unpleasant; being totally committed to obtaining a settlemẽnt might ev. en involve '' 'deliberate deception" (Stevens, 1963, p. 129) . Many disputants will not ẽasily be persuaded to accept aggressive mediation as the route to fmal settlẽment. They will prefer, in certain circumstances, to fall back on section 64(4)(e) of the Industrial Relations Act -which allows t11e mediator to arbitrate -rather than submit to the pressures of aggressive mediation. Indeed, a pattern is alr· eady beginning to emerge: the New . Zealand neutral commonly enters a dispute "as a mediator and may leave as an arbitrator" (Miller, 1983, p . . 29) .
Finally, a more ẽnthusiastic approach to the use of directive strategies is not without some cost in tenus of potential long-run alienation of certain parties from agency mediators. The private mediator can take the risk of irritating the parties by his aggressivẽ behaviour because he may never again have to face them. For the full-time agency mediator, the likelihood of once more n1eeting up with one or other of the disputants is much greater and so maintaining rapport with the parties is crucial for his future effectiveness. This cost might be considered totally unjustifled when evidence giv· en in Tables 5 and 6 suggests that the parties are more than reasonably satisfied with the mediation process as it presently operates . . tial strategies of mediation. This has helped to a .,.... mediation process. This paper tries to mnove of tllil it is possible, in fact, to recognise 3 broad sets ofstraleiJies. a framework in which to measure the frequency that certaiJt stnr&a&llsate and the importance attached to these strategies in terms of the basic approach has been essentially descriptive, the paper question. Will the mediation process in New Zealand be if greater willingness to adopt (and employers and union officers display a to accept) more aggressive mediator strategies?
